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Comments on Why does Firefox block based on a restrictive default-src directive, when more specific, more permissive *-src exist?

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Why does Firefox block based on a restrictive default-src directive, when more specific, more permissive *-src exist?

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I am working on a website which unfortunately uses a mix of linked and inline CSS and Javascript (and, even more unfortunately, I can't do a lot about the use of inline CSS and Javascript), and am trying to set up an appropriate Content-Security-Policy for it.

When I serve the content (over proper HTTPS with a CA-signed certificate) with a CSP that doesn't include any default-src directive, things work as I expect. For example, if the HTTP response contains the two HTTP headers

Content-Security-Policy: style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline' https://fonts.googleapis.com/;
Content-Security-Policy: font-src 'self' https://fonts.gstatic.com/;

then Google-hosted fonts are loaded; if I remove the https://fonts.gstatic.com/ entry from font-src but leave the font-src directive itself in place, then the browser reports that they were blocked based on font-src. This is exactly what I expect to happen.

However, if I also add a third HTTP header

Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'self';

then I get a whole bunch of errors, including ones where the reference points at the beginning of an inline <style> element, even though I'm still serving the same style-src directive as above including the 'unsafe-inline' in its own CSP HTTP header.

MDN says that (my emphasis):

The HTTP Content-Security-Policy (CSP) default-src directive serves as a fallback for the other CSP fetch directives. For each of the following directives that are absent, the user agent looks for the default-src directive and uses this value for it:

style-src is one of the directives thus listed, and 'self' is one of the valid values for default-src.

I would expect the more specific (and in this case, more permissive) style-src to take precedence over the more restrictive, fallback default-src, but that doesn't seem to be happening. Rather, it seems that the default-src directive is being used instead of (or possibly as further restricting) the more specific style-src directive.

Although Firefox doesn't currently support the corresponding *-src-attr and *-src-elem directives, I tried adding script-src-attr, script-src-elem, style-src-attr and style-src-elem anyway with the same value as script-src and style-src respectively just to see if it would make any difference. The only observable difference was the browser complaining about the four unsupported CSP directives.

What am I missing? Is the CSP default-src directive useless for my use case, and I need to list all CSP directives explicitly to get the effect I am after, namely providing a highly restrictive policy for everything that doesn't actually need to be more permissive?

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2 comment threads

Stylesheet being loaded perhaps referring to a resource at fonts.gstatic.com? (4 comments)
Sending multiple headers won't work (4 comments)
Sending multiple headers won't work
Moshi‭ wrote over 2 years ago

Multiple Headers can only be more restrictive

I assume that each Content-Security-Policy: line you have is a separate CSP header. If you send each separately, then the default-src will be applied in addition to the style-src. It doesn't explain why it fails when you put them in a single header though.

Canina‭ wrote over 2 years ago · edited over 2 years ago

Moshi‭ On what do you base the statement (as I interpret it, at least) that the default-src would further restrict a style-src? That would make default-src not a fallback for when a more appropriate CSP directive isn't provided (which MDN seems to me to say), but a maximum ever possible permission set. Compare https://infosec.mozilla.org/guidelines/web_security#content-security-policy Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'self'; img-src 'self' https://i.imgur.com; object-src 'none'

Skipping 1 deleted comment.

Moshi‭ wrote over 2 years ago · edited over 2 years ago

Canina‭

The headers are applied independently; default-src is the fallback within the header.

So for an inline style, we check the first header:

Content-Security-Policy: style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline' https://fonts.googleapis.com/;

All good here, we have 'unsafe-inline'. We then check the second header

Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'self';

The second header doesn't have style-src, so it checks default-src, which only allows 'self', and so it doesn't pass.

Canina‭ wrote over 2 years ago · edited over 2 years ago

Moshi‭ Finally! That really was the problem. Would you be so kind as to post that as an answer, ideally even with a reference to a standard explicitly backing up the claim that default-src applies only within the single Content-Security-Policy HTTP header where it appears and not across CSP HTTP headers, thereby making a lone Content-Security-Policy: default-src <something>; more of a restricting override than a fallback? (I can see that at least in Firefox, that appears to be exactly the case, but it's always better if one can point at a standard that actually spells it out in so many words.)